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Evaluating the Economic Performance of Property Systems

By James Bessen*

Abstract: How should the economic performance of property systems be evaluated?
Benefit-cost analysis is widely used to evaluate non-market based regulation when prices
are not available. Market prices provide better information for property systems, but market
prices are not necessarily socially optimal when property rights are imperfect. This paper
discusses two practical approaches to evaluating the performance of property systems, one
based on an analysis of institutional performance, the other based on measuring incentives.
As an illustration, I show how these approaches might be used to evaluate the US patent
system.
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Introduction
A well developed literature and practice evaluates the economic performance of government
programs using non-market forms of regulation. Policy analysts use benefit-cost analysis to evaluate
non-market resource allocations, following Kaldor (1939) and Hicks (1939). This provides a useful
way of evaluating economic performance when prices are not available. For example, applied
economists use this approach and related metrics to evaluate environmental regulation (Stavins 2008,
Tietenberg 2002) or the regulation of common pool resources (Ostrom 1990).
However, following Coase (1960) and Arrow (1970, 1971), markets can be used as a form of
regulation alternative to Pigovian taxes/subsidies and to command-and-control policies. If the
government can create appropriate property rights, externalities can be internalized and markets can be
used to achieve Pareto optimal regulation. Examples include tradable pollution permits overcoming
pollution externalities and patents overcoming free-rider externalities.
But how can property systems be evaluated? It is sometimes argued, often implicitly, that there is
no need to evaluate property systems. Indeed, many new rights have been created in recent years
without any formal evaluation of their performance.1 With property systems, in contrast to non-market
regulatory systems, prices are usually available. With well-defined and enforceable property rights,
these prices reveal the values placed on goods by market participants and, with competitive markets,
these prices should theoretically lead to a Pareto optimal resource allocation.
However, property rights are not always perfectly defined and enforced. For example, poorly
defined land rights have given rise to squatters on Brazil’s frontier (Alston et al. 1999) and problems

1 Some examples are new rights for databases in Europe, new property-like assets created by through securitization of
financial instruments, and the extension of patent rights to cover genes, software, methods of doing business, and mental
processes.
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defining patent rights have caused excessive litigation in some technologies (Bessen and Meurer
2008a). In these cases, prices do not necessarily lead to a Pareto optimal allocation nor do they
necessarily reveal the intrinsic value placed on resources by market participants, as I show in a related
paper (Bessen 2009). And applied economists are well aware that the institutional details of property
rights matter. An empirical literature studies the importance of institutional features such as titling and
public notice for the performance of property rights.2
Surprisingly, the theoretical literature seems to lack a general model of property rights where
those rights might be both imperfectly defined and/or imperfectly enforced.3 There is a literature on
regulatory compliance with uncertain enforcement,4 however, that literature does not address specific
issues related to property rights. There is also a literature on patents with uncertain enforcement,5 but
this literature also does not deal with imperfect definition of patents. Imperfectly defined property
rights can generate overlapping claims on the same asset. One problem with overlapping claims,
especially where property boundaries do not correspond to the optimal economic division, is that they
can lead to an “anticommons” (Heller 1998, 2008). This has been modeled by Buchanan and Yoon
(2000) and Schulz et al. (2002). Shapiro developed a similar model specifically for patents (2001).

2 Bessen and Meurer (2008) on patents, De Soto (2000), Lanjouw and Levy (2002), Besley (1995), Alston et al. (1996),
Alston et al. (1999), Clay (2006) on conflicting rights, Miceli et al. (2002) on titling, Miceli et al. (2001), Gerard (2001)
on mining patents, Baker et al. (2001) on adverse possession, Lueck and Libecap (2009) on surveying and recording
systems, Lueck (1995) on possession rules.
3 Barzel (2003) describes problems of definition and enforcement as problems of transaction costs. Defining transaction
costs broadly as “the resources used to establish and maintain economic rights,” he states that (p. 52) “Without
transaction costs, property rights are well-defined and enforced, which implies that all imposition of costs on one party
by another result in full compensation.” But this approach fails to identify concretely what happens when property rights
are poorly defined or enforced.
4 This literature includes Calfee and Craswell (1984), Craswell and Calfee (1986), Kaplow (1990), Kolstad et al. (1990),
and Shavell (1984).
5 Models of patents with uncertain enforcement include Bessen (2005), Bessen and Meurer (2006), Crampes and
Langinier (2002), Farrell and Shapiro (2008), Lemley and Shapiro (2005), Meurer (1989), and Shapiro (2001).
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However, these models generally assume certain enforcement. In this paper I use a simple model of
imperfect property rights where those rights might be both imperfectly defined and imperfectly
enforced.
It is, of course, possible to evaluate property systems by conducting a full welfare analysis or a
benefit-cost analysis. However, the data to make such evaluations appear difficult to obtain in many
cases. This paper outlines two methods for obtaining limited evaluations of property systems that do
not have such difficult data requirements. Using a model of exclusionary property rights, I show that
there are several ways property systems can fail to achieve Pareto optimal allocations. These are each
related to distinct institutional failures. This provides a first criterion for evaluating performance:
whether property institutions do what they are supposed to do or not. Although this method of
evaluation does not provide a quantitative measure of misallocation, it identifies specific institutional
failures that correspond to market distortions.
Second, using the model, I show that estimates of the private value of assets and of the costs of
disputes over rights—both of which can be estimated in some cases—provide a means for measuring
performance in the case of one particular type of failures.
To illustrate the application of these methods, I show how they could be applied to evaluating the
operation of the US patent system. In the next section I develop a simple but general model of property
rights with possibly imperfect enforcement and imperfect definition. Following that, I describe how
some aspects of economic performance can be evaluated using the model and I then perform that
analysis using data on the US patent system.

A Model of Exclusionary Property Rights
To fix ideas, I model a congestion externality. With slight modification, the same model can be
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applied to other types of externalities, including positive externalities. The model considers two sorts of
private, exclusionary property rights: simple possession and legal exclusionary rights. I assume that a
single party “possesses” an asset. Possession gives that party limited, privately-enforced exclusionary
rights.6 Although there are many different sorts of private enforcement, including mechanisms
involving reputation, repeated interaction, boycotts and threats of violence, I model these rights as
enforced by a simple technological exclusion such as a wall or a fence. That is, possession means that
other parties face an extra cost if they seek to expropriate the asset.
I also consider legal exclusionary rights where one or more owners obtain legal title that conveys
a right of exclusion that can be enforced in court. Both obtaining title and legal enforcement involve
costs to the owner and enforcement is not perfect. Note also that because the rights might not be
perfectly defined, multiple parties might obtain legal claims to the same asset, including nonpossessing parties (I assume that the possessing party can also obtain legal title).

Externality
I begin with a simple model of a congestion externality of the sort that has been used to model
natural resources.7 Since the focus of this paper is on the effect of property rights on the pricing of
assets, this same analysis can be done easily with a positive externality instead, e.g., patents on
inventions. I choose to model a congestion externality because that is the sort of externality that Garret
Hardin (1976) and others have used to discuss property rights.
Let x designate the extent of an activity undertaken using a scarce resource. This variable could

6 This is a bit of an oversimplification because possession gives rise to legally enforceable claims as well in some cases.
To the extent that this is true, possessory rights can be modeled as legally enforceable rights.
7 See, for example, Gordon (1954). For an early model of road congestion externalities see Knight (1924).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1427904

6
represent the number of cattle grazing on a pasture (Hardin 1976), or the number of fishing boats on a
particular fishing ground (Gordon 1954), or the number of cars in a parking lot (Buchanan and Yoon
2000). Let c be the unit cost of this activity, for example, the cost of a head of cattle or of a fishing boat
rental (in the parking lot example, c = 0).
Let v(x) be the average consumer value derived from each unit of x, where v is positive and twice
differentiable. Thus v represents the value of each head of cattle after grazing, or the average catch per
boat on the fishing ground or the value of parking a car. The congestion externality implies that v'(x) <
0. I further assume that the marginal effect of the externality is non-decreasing, that is, v''(x) ≤ 0.8
Note that v implicitly includes both technological factors, such as the the weight gain of each
head of cattle, and market factors, such as the price per pound of beef. Because of the latter, v reflects
the relative scarcity of the asset; that is, for example, if there is a lot of pasture land, then the price of
beef will be relatively low and so the value derived from grazing on this particular pasture will be
lower than if pasture land were less plentiful. Finally, note that v also reflects investments made in
improving the asset. In some contexts, for example patents on inventions, the emphasis of analysis has
been on investment incentives.

Social Optimum
Assume that there are a large number of prospective users of the asset and that both the users and
the social planner are risk neutral. The net social surplus is
(1)

S(x) = v(x) x – c x.

8 My results will hold with a less restrictive assumption, however, this assumption seems reasonable enough and it
simplifies the exposition.
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To assure a well-behaved social optimum with x > 0, I assume further that

(2)

v(0) > c and

where is the (negative) elasticity of v with respect to x.
Then the first order condition for the social optimum and the corresponding net surplus are

(3)
This first order condition provides our benchmark of Pareto optimality. Note that this allocation
corresponds to a price. Suppose that a single agent had perfect control over the use of the asset. That
agent could achieve this Pareto optimal allocation by charging each user a unit price
(4)

.

Suppose there are M users and the jth user has activity level xj. Since there is a competitive market,
users would acquire rights to use the asset until the individual profit of the jth user is zero:

where summation is over all participating users. It is straightforward to show that the property owner
realizes the rent maximizing allocation by charging the Pareto optimal price and the zero profit
condition is solved when xj = xS, or, in other words, the Pareto optimal allocation is realized. The
property owner, in this case, receives the entire social surplus.

Possession
Now suppose that there are no legal property rights, however, the single agent who possesses the
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asset takes private measures to exclude users. Suppose that these measures impose an additional unit
cost of c0 on users. There are two sorts of allocations realized, depending on the value of c0.
If c0

pS, then the asset owner will maximize profits by charging a price p* = pS. The owner is

able to charge the Pareto optimal price because the exclusionary measures are sufficiently costly to
prospective users.
If, instead, c0

pS, then the best that the owner can do is to charge p* = c0.9 In this case, it is

straightforward to show that xj > xS, or, in other words, weak exclusion leads to overuse of the asset.
In these situations, the addition of a legal property right can enhance social welfare.

Legal exclusionary rights
Now suppose that the party who possesses the asset can also obtain legal title by spending t.
However, because the asset boundaries might not be perfectly defined for a variety of reasons (see
Bessen 2009), a total of N parties can obtain legal claims on the asset. Note that I interpret this
condition broadly to include cases where multiple parties have claims to a single usable asset at its
socially optimal scale. For example, a shopping mall might be the best social use for some land, but the
land might be subdivided into smaller, socially inefficient house-sized plots. In this case, the
boundaries of the housing plots are technically well-defined, but technological indivisibilities make
these plots sub-optimal.
Let the possessing agent be designated i = 1 and the remaining, non-possessing agents, i = 2,...N.
I assume that possession is sufficient to provide notice, that is, prospective users know that owner 1 has

9

In the unconstrained case, the owner makes out best with the unconstrained rent maximizing price. In the constrained case,
the owner makes out best when the price equals the constraint (c0) because the owner’s rents decrease monotonically
with price at any given x.
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rights to the asset. The non-possessing owners, however, must choose to spend u in order to provide
notice ex ante. I assume that this cost is not so large as to deter formal acquisition of rights and that
prospective users of an asset know the number of rights that claim the asset but they do not know the
identities of those rights holders ex ante.10 They search costlessly for these identities and find only the
identities of those rights holders who have spent u to improve their notice. They then contract with
those rights holders. An important feature of the model is that it does not pay all rights holders to spend
u, and, consequently, some rights are not contracted over ex ante.
The combination of legal and privately enforced exclusion can be modeled as a game with the
following stages (see Figure 1):
1. Asset owners Ai, i = 1,..., N, each decide whether to spend t to obtain title. Non-possessing
owners, i = 2,..., N, decide whether to spend an additional u to provide notice. Each ith owner
declares a price, pi.
2. Prospective users search for the identities of asset owners and find those who have spent u in
addition to user i = 1. Prospective users decide whether to pay the owners they have identified,
to use the asset without paying ex ante, or to not use the asset at all.
3. Each of M users, Bj, who chooses to use the asset in amount xj sinks c xj into its use.11 Given
the competitive nature of the market, users enter until the zero profit condition is met.
4. Asset owners can costlessly detect use of the asset. If Bj uses the asset but does not pay owner
Ai, they bargain to reach a settlement prior to litigation. I assume that the negotiation, if
successful, realizes a Nash bargaining solution with each party receiving equal shares of the net
surplus.
5. If negotiations breakdown, then Ai initiates a lawsuit against Bj at a cost L to each party. Party Ai
wins the suit with probability 1 – qi, independently of actions taken by other asset owners.12 If

10 This is a strong assumption and it could be modeled more realistically as a game of Bayesian inference where the asset
users have priors about the number of rights holders and in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium the actual number of rights
holders correspond to their (possibly) updated priors.
11 Or (c + c0) xj if using the asset without permission of the possessing owner.
12

A more complicated model might consider the possibility that a lawsuit with one party might influence the probability of
winning for other parties. In this case, the variables qi represent the probability of winning given the actions of other
parties. However, since lawsuits don’t occur in equilibrium under the other assumptions made, this interpretation should
not affect the results.
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party Ai wins, it receives an injunction against Bj. I assume that under these conditions, Bj will
settle by paying v xj.

To simplify the outcomes, I assume that there is a minimum efficient scale for users, x, such that
xj

x and c0 x > L > 0. This is sufficient to assure that when rights are relatively certain, both parties

can credibly threaten to engage in a lawsuit and that such lawsuits will always be settled in stage 4.
This simplifies the discussion, however, it obviously does not apply to those situations where the direct
costs of litigation are excessive.

Solution Regions
I assume that property owners choose prices that maximize their rents subject to Cournot
assumptions (taking other prices as given) and subject to the zero profit condition for asset users. An
owner might not be able to realize the price that brings the greatest possible rent because that price
might be so high that users will choose to ignore the property rights and take their chances in ex post
negotiation or, possibly, litigation. This condition places a constraint on the maximum price that any
owner can charge. Ignoring for the moment whether the ith owner can charge this price, the first order
maximizing condition for the unconstrained rent-maximizing price is (see Appendix for calculations)
(5)
where x* is level of total activity given the zero profit condition and the given prices.
The ith owner will be able to get this price as long as asset users make more by paying this
amount than they could get from a Stage 4 negotiation. The per unit amount that the ith owner gets
from a Stage 4 negotiation with activity level x is
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(6)
If

, then asset users will choose to pay the unconstrained price, pi*, and, because this is a

rent-maximizing price, asset owner i will also make out best at this price. Otherwise, if

,

asset users will make out better by not paying unless the owner charges a “constrained” price of pi or
less. In this case, it is straightforward to show that the asset owner makes out best by charging exactly
pi, leaving the owner indifferent to getting paid or going to Stage 4 enforcement and leaving the asset
users indifferent to paying or not.13
Non-possessing owners’ decision to spend u to improve public notice of their rights depends on
whether they are able to charge the unconstrained price or not. If so, then they will spend u, because
they make out better by getting paid rather than by taking enforcement action. But if the price is
constrained, then they are indifferent to whether they get paid up front or whether they take
enforcement action. In this latter case, a non-possessing owner (j > 1) will not spend u to improve
public notice and, as a result, it will not contract with users ex ante, but will, instead, pursue its claims
ex post (Stage 4) where it will receive this amount from a negotiated settlement. This means that this
scenario gives rise to ex post disputes and, possibly, to litigation. It is the only scenario in this model
that does give rise to disputes.
Note also that the possessing property owner might not choose to obtain legal title. If c0 > p*,
then the possessing property owner makes out better just by utilizing the degree of technological
exclusion provided by possession. In this case, the owner can charge the rent-maximizing price without

13

The intuition here is that owners’ profits decrease monotonically with the activity level, x, once x exceeds rentmaximizing level. Under the zero profit condition, the lower the price, the greater the level of x, hence as prices fall
below the rent-maximizing price, profits decline.
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having to pay title cost, t, and without having to engage in enforcement activity.
Given these distinctions, I show in the Appendix that the efficiency performance of the different
solutions falls into four zones, depending on whether there are multiple property owners with claims on
the asset and whether one or more of those owners can charge their unconstrained rent maximizing
price. These results are summarized by the chart in Figure 2.
{Figure 2 about here}
The top row includes cases where at least one owner is able to charge the unconstrained price.
The Pareto optimal allocation is only realized when there is a single owner with a right that is relatively
certain to be enforced (unconstrained price). In this case, property users obey the law and respect
property rights. When a single owner owns a relatively uncertain right, then the price is constrained
and there is too much use of the resource—“weak” property rights tend in the direction of the “tragedy
of the commons.” In addition, a single owner of a relatively uncertain right will not spend u to establish
clear notice. This results in a dispute (at Stage 4) and, possibly, litigation.
On the other hand, when there are multiple owners, there will be too little use of the resource
compared to the Pareto optimal level as long as one or more of the owners have rights that are
relatively certain to be enforced. When there are multiple owners, all with relatively certain rights, this
gives rise to an “anti-commons” where the failure of owners to coordinate gives rise to excessively
high prices and a socially low level of resource use. When one owner has a strong right, but additional
owners have rights that are relatively unlikely to be enforced, this situation might be better described as
one of “notice failure” (see Bessen 2009). In this case, poorly defined rights give rise to disputes and
litigation and the resource is also underutilized. When multiple owners all have relatively uncertain
rights, the resource allocation could provide too little or too much use compared to the Pareto optimal
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level.
The economic performance of a property system thus depends on where that system falls on these
two dimensions: whether the asset owner(s) can charge their rent maximizing price or not and whether
there are multiple legal claims on the asset or not. These dimensions correspond loosely, but not
exactly to the oft-cited requirement that property rights need to be “enforceable and well-defined.” An
insufficient probability of enforcement can constrain the price that the asset owner charges. However, if
technological exclusion measures are sufficiently effective, then a Pareto optimal price can be realized
even when the legal right has uncertain enforcement, but, in this case, asset owners will simply not
obtain title to the property. Similarly, multiple claimants can arise when rights are not well-defined, but
they can also arise when the rights are clearly defined, but are sub-optimally small. However, these two
sub-cases can be distinguished because, according to the model, poorly defined rights give rise to
disputes and litigation, while rights that are merely sub-optimally small do not.

Evaluation
Institutional Performance
This framework provides a means for categorizing the performance of a property system
according to where that system falls on the chart in Figure 2. And, to some extent, this can be
determined by examining the performance of the titling and notice institutions of that property system.
If these institutions work as they are supposed to, then this indicates that the system likely falls into the
“optimal” cell in the upper left; if the institutions don’t work as they are supposed to, then this might
mean the system falls into a sub-optimal cell. Several straightforward questions can be used to
categorize institutional performance:
1. Do most property owners obtain title? For example, De Soto (2000) documents cases where
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large numbers of property owners do not obtain title in less developed countries. Several factors
might induce owners not to seek title: title might be too expensive to obtain, rights might be
unreliably enforced, or private means of exclusion might work sufficiently well so as to make
title superfluous.
2. Is there evidence that property owners have overlapping rights? One sort of such evidence is
that property owners are aware of the benefits of coordination and attempt to coordinate,
whether that effort is successful or not. For example, Libecap and Wiggins (Libecap and
Wiggins 1985, Wiggins and Libecap 1985) document that owners of oil field leases understand
the benefits of unitary control, even though they are often unable to contract to achieve such
coordination.14
3. Do the property institutions provide effective public notice of boundaries? This involves several
subsidiary inquiries. Is boundary information publicly available? Are access and search costs
low? For example, is the information in standardized forms and are third parties available to
conduct the search? Is the interpretation of the information predictable? For example, are
district court or agency decisions often overturned? Are reliable third party interpretations
available and insurable? Do users of the asset usually perform a thorough clearance search
before investments are sunk? An example of notice failure in land occurs on the Brazilian
frontier where conflicting laws give overlapping rights both to absentee owners of large estates
and to settler squatters (Alston et al. 1999).

14 Heller (2008) suggests that property owners might not want their desire to coordinate to become public knowledge.
Except in cases where the coordination is in blatant violation of antitrust statutes, there does not seem to be a clear
economic motive to suppress such information. To the contrary, because parties can privately gain by coordinating, they
have economic incentives to make their willingness to do so public knowledge.
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A decision tree based on these inquiries is shown in Figure 3. If asset owners do not obtain title
this might be because the property system is ineffective—e.g., title is too expensive or enforcement is
too unreliable—or it might mean that private exclusion measures are simply effective enough. The
other outcomes correspond to the various cells in Figure 2. Thus these inquiries into institutional
performance shed some light on the qualitative nature of the economic performance of the property
system. This helps identify the sources of institutional failure, if any, but it does not directly provide a
quantitative measure of how bad any such failure might be.

Quantitative evaluation of patent notice
For one specific scenario—notice failure—it is possible to estimate a lower bound of the extent
to which prices exceed the Pareto optimal level. Further, given an estimate of the elasticity of v, one
can then estimate a lower bound on the associated loss of welfare.
In this scenario, one owner, A1, has a right that is relatively likely to be enforced and can
therefore charge the unconstrained price, p1*. However, because property rights are not well-defined,
other owners, Aj, j=2,...N, have rights that are relatively unlikely to be enforced and they can only
charge their constrained prices, pj . The total actual price that a user pays to all asset owners is

Pa
(7)

N

p1

pj
j 2

xa

N

1 q j v xa

j 2

where xa is the equilibrium level of use. The first term in parentheses corresponds to that portion of the
total price going to the property owner with the relatively certain right while the second term
corresponds to that portion going to the owners of “weaker” rights.15 In this scenario, the optimal price

15

Note that litigation cost, L, does not enter this expression because under the assumptions made, all disputes are settled in
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would be realized if owner 1 held the only legal claim to the asset. In that case, the total price would be
.

(8)

Define the share of actual rents going to the “weaker” property owners

(9)

.

As long as Z is not too large and v does not decrease too rapidly with small changes in x, then (see
Appendix)

(10)

ln

Pa
P

R
2

.

This represents the extent to which poorly defined property rights inflate costs to asset users. These
inflated prices make use of the asset suboptimal. The magnitude of this under-utilization depends on
the elasticity, , but with an estimate in hand, the associated loss of social welfare can be calculated.
The ratio R can also be estimated. In this scenario, claimants with relatively uncertain rights (that
is, j = 2,...,N) assert their rights after the users have sunk their investments. This means that the rents
paid to “weak” property owners represents a risk of ex post disputes that asset users will take into
account when they make their decisions to enter the market and invest. Alternatively, the asset owner
with relatively certain rights (user 1) can indemnify her customers against these risks, as is typically
done in many markets, and correspondingly increase the price charged. The result is the same,
however, in that the risk inflates the effective price of asset use. The numerator of R thus represents the

Stage 4 without going to trial (see Appendix). To the extent that disputes eventually do go to trial, the rents would be net
of litigation cost in a more realistic model. However, this makes no difference in practice to the calculation I perform
below. Also, if rights are so uncertain that an asset owner cannot credibly commit to spending L in Stage 5, then that
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expected dispute risk to asset users while the denominator represents the total rents realized from the
asset by all users, making R the share of dispute risk in total rents. Where a lower bound on dispute risk
can be estimated (as I show below for the case of patents), then these can be compared to measures of
total rents received to obtain an estimate of the degree of excessive prices. My simple model does not
consider other losses from disputes (e.g., lost business, management distraction costs) and it assumes
that disputes settle before going to trial, thus avoiding direct litigation costs. To the extent that these
costs add to the ex ante risk to asset users, they also increase the effective price of asset use and should
thus also be included in this calculation. Note, finally, that this calculation only applies to the case of
“notice failure,” where a single party owns a relatively certain right and other parties have relatively
uncertain rights.

Example: Patents
Patents are property rights in inventions intended to overcome the free-riding externality. How do
patents perform at this task? Boldrin and Levine (2008) argue that patents are neither necessary nor
helpful at promoting innovation. In this section, I apply the limited framework developed above to
some empirical evidence about patents. I do this as a simple illustration of the approach developed
here, rather than as an exhaustive final analysis of the US patent system. A complete analysis would
need to go into greater depth and consider a wider range of evidence than I present here. Nevertheless,
a brief consideration might help illustrate some of the main themes of my proposed approach to
evaluating property rights systems.
Note that patents address a free-riding externality. This is a positive externality while the
congestion externality I modeled above is a negative externality. Nevertheless, the model can be readily

right is not enforced, that owner does not collect rents, and so does not appear in this equation.
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adapted to the case of patents with only some minor differences.16 Indeed, Shapiro (2001) creates a
model that is an instance of my model, for the specific case where there are overlapping rights that are
all relatively certain to be enforced.

Institutional performance
First, consider the three inquiries concerning institutional performance (for a more complete
discussion of some of this evidence, see Bessen and Meurer 2008a):
1. Do most property owners obtain title? Table 1 shows the percentage of public firms in several
high tech industries that applied for patents in 1999 or earlier that were granted by 2002. In
almost all of these industries, most firms acquire patents. The exception is business services
including software (these firms are mostly in the software industry). Software firms might
obtain patents less frequently because historically the law significantly limited the degree to
which software inventions could be patented. However, by 1999, case law affirming the validity
of software patents had been well established. More important, the high degree of innovation
during the decades when software patents were not routinely issued indicates that private means
of exclusion (trade secrecy, first mover advantage, etc.) are highly effective in the software
industry so that legal property rights might be frequently superfluous.
2. Is there evidence that property owners have overlapping rights? Industry participants contend
that patent “thickets” exist in some industries such as information technology and electronics
industries (Levin et al. 1987). Surveys find that among the main reasons to acquire patents are

16 The main difference is that v now represents the demand for the technology among heterogeneous users. In this setting,
social welfare is calculated slightly differently: it now includes rents, as with the congestion externality, but it also
includes infra-marginal consumers’ surplus.
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blocking competitors from developing their own technologies, preventing lawsuits (through
threat of counter-suits) and for use in negotiations (Cohen et al. 2002). These uses only make
sense if multiple firms have overlapping patent rights on each others’ technologies. On the other
hand, outside of standard setting organizations, which are a special case, there appears to be
little effort to establish patent pools (see Lerner et al. 2003), even though antitrust authorities
have set forth clear guidelines for doing so (US Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission 1995). Furthermore, survey evidence among biomedical researchers and lawyers
finds that overlapping patents rarely force researchers to abandon research paths; instead, they
ignore patents in cases of possible conflict (Walsh et al. 2003). In summary, the evidence
suggests that overlapping patent rights might be significant in some industries, but evidence of
an “anticommons” is weak at best. The evidence might be more consistent with a “notice
failure” scenario where many overlapping rights have relatively uncertain prospects of
enforcement.
3. Do the property institutions provide effective public notice of boundaries? This involves several
subsidiary inquiries:
a) Is boundary information publicly available? Although patent documents are made public (in
some cases only when the patents issue), it is possible for patent applicants to revise the
claims in their patents over many years and by doing so, to effectively change the
boundaries of their rights. One method of doing this is to maintain continuing applications,
and by the late 1990s, nearly one third of all patent applications were continuing
applications as opposed to original applications (Bessen and Meurer 2008a).
b) Is the interpretation of the information predictable? Courts interpret patent boundaries
through a process known as “claim construction.” However, this process has become
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unpredictable so that nearly 40% of district court claim interpretations are overturned on
appeal (Moore 2005). It is even more difficult to obtain a reliable determination of patent
boundaries prior to a lawsuit. Although lawyers will provide interpretations of patent
boundaries, these are expensive, they are not guaranteed and the market for insurance
against misinterpretations hardly functions (Betterley 2006). This contrasts, say, with the
predictable role of surveyors in interpreting land deeds and the availability of title insurance
for land.
c) Do asset users usually perform thorough clearance searches before investments are sunk?
According to a survey of patent counsel who are members of the Intellectual Property
Owners Association, 65% do not always conduct clearance searches before introducing a
product (Cockburn and Henderson 2003). In some industries such as computers and
software, firms routinely do not conduct clearance searches because the numbers of
overlapping patents they would have to search would make the cost of search prohibitively
expensive, aside from the unpredictability of any determinations.
In sum, firms in most technology industries do acquire patents, indicating that these property
rights do deliver positive private value. However, there is substantial evidence that some of the public
notice functions of the patent system do not work well. Patent boundaries can be hidden for significant
periods of time, interpretation of these boundaries is unpredictable and, not surprisingly, clearance
searches are not conducted in many industries. For these reasons, the institutions of the patent system
do not function as property systems are supposed to function. This inquiry does not, however, reveal
how significant this failure is.
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Quantitative evaluation of patent notice failure
Given the diagnosis of notice failure, the next step is to obtain a quantitative evaluation of this
failure, specifically by estimating the extent to which prices exceed the Pareto optimal level as in
equation (10). The variable R in (10) can be approximated as follows. First, the denominator represents
the total rents received, in this case, the discounted expected future returns to R&D investment. In a
competitive equilibrium with free entry, firms will invest in R&D until the total R&D investment
equals the expected present value of future R&D rents from that investment. Beyond this point, further
investment is no longer profitable. This means that under competitive equilibrium, the denominator
equals the level of R&D spending. This will be true even when notice failure raises prices above their
Pareto optimal level. Of course, barriers to entry in the performance of R&D might limit R&D
spending, providing rents in excess of the R&D investment, but these barriers to entry are also likely to
raise prices even further above the Pareto optimal level. Consequently, even without competitive
markets, R&D spending is likely to serve as a first order approximation of R&D rents.
The numerator represents the rents going to the holders of relatively uncertain rights. As above,
this corresponds to the risk of ex post disputes. This risk can be estimated from the loss of wealth that
firms experience following the filing of a lawsuit against them using event study methods (see Bessen
and Meurer 2008b).17 Since some disputes are settled without a lawsuit being filed, this loss of wealth
understates the total dispute risk and thus understates the rents to owners of uncertain rights.18

17 In practice, lawsuits also involve deadweight loss in addition to a transfer. In the model above, I ignored such
deadweight loss and included conditions so that litigation would not occur. It is straightforward to extend the model to
scenarios where litigation occurs and where it creates deadweight losses. Deadweight losses increase the cost to users of
the technology, thus driving up effective relative prices, so these should be included in the numerator of R. Note,
moreover, that these estimates of lost wealth include the majority of cases where lawsuits are settled prior to trial.
18 Note that I am comparing the current litigation risk to current R&D spending. However, current R&D spending
corresponds, in equilibrium, to future rents earned on innovations. Thus to the extent that R&D has been increasing, my
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From the analysis of lawsuit filings for US public firms in 1999 (Bessen and Meurer 2008b), I
obtain an estimate for loss of wealth of $29 billion (in 1999 dollars), after accounting for underreporting and the stock market “bubble” (see the paper for details). This compares with $160 billion of
non-Federal spending on industrial R&D in 1999. Inserting these values into (10) implies that patent
notice problems increased the effective prices of technologies at least 9% above their optimal levels.
The true value might be substantially greater, given that the estimate of R ignores disputes that are
settled without litigation.
The effect of this mis-pricing on R&D spending and on social welfare depends on the price
elasticity of technology. Nevertheless, it is clear that at reasonable values for this elasticity, notice
failure reduced technology use and slowed R&D spending, although these reductions were not
necessarily very large.
This price premium can also be compared to the “effective subsidy” that patents provide to R&D
spending. Schankerman (1998) reviews the literature and concludes that this effective subsidy rate is
only 10-15%, somewhat less than the increase in effective technology prices resulting from notice
failure. Bessen and Meurer (2008a) compare litigation risk with private returns from patents among
public companies and find that in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, the private benefits
substantially exceed the litigation risk, but that in other industries, the reverse is true. Thus the
excessive user cost of technology arising from poorly defined patent boundaries might well eliminate
the net incentives the patent system provides in overcoming free riding.

Conclusion
This paper provides a framework for evaluating the performance of property systems when rights

estimate of R is understated.
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might not be perfectly enforced and perfectly defined. I identify several distinct patterns of behavior
associated with distinct institutional failures. The framework provides a simple set of inquiries to
evaluate institutional performance and a quantitative means to measure the significance of one sort of
institutional failure, specifically notice failure.
Applying this framework to the current US patent system as an illustration, I find evidence that
patent institutions fail in several ways to provide clear notice of property boundaries and that this
increases technology prices significantly above their Pareto optimal level.
This evidence, although strongly suggestive, is also limited. Although I identify specific
institutional failings, this does not imply that patent reform can or cannot correct these failings. In
contrast, Boldrin and Levine (2008) argue that patents are not necessary to encourage innovation and
that society would be better off without them. My limited evaluation of the patent system cannot make
such global judgments.
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Appendix
Solution zones
First, consider the ith asset owner’s rent maximizing problem. That owner seeks to choose a
price, pi, taking the prices of all other asset owners as given. The rents will also depend on the level of
use, x, which is determined by the free entry zero profit condition,
N

vx

pj

c

0

j 1

(A1)

.

The Lagrangean for this constrained maximization problem is
N

x, pi

pi x

vx

pi

pj c
j i

with a first order condition of
(A2)

pi

x vx

as in (5). Alternatively, the ith asset owner can pursue an enforcement action against the jth asset user.
The payoffs to the asset owner and asset user in Stage 4 (under the assumptions, parties will always
settle in Stage 4 rather than go to litigation in Stage 5) can easily be shown to be

{

1 qi v x x j , qi v x x j }

From this, the user will be indifferent between paying ex ante and going into Stage 4 negotiations when
the price charge by owner i is(A3)
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In other words, this is the largest price that the asset owner can charge; when this is less that pi*,
this will be the “constrained” price. In this case, the asset owner makes the same profit by charging this
price ex ante as by negotiating ex post, so there is no advantage to either party to forming an ex ante
contract. This means that the asset owner has nothing to gain from spending u in order to establish
notice in this case. The net result is that relatively uncertain enforcement, asset owners end up in
disputes (or litigation) and they only expect to receive an amount equal to the constrained price.
On the other hand, when pi > pi*, the asset owner has an incentive to charge pi* ex ante and
therefore to spend u to put prospective users on notice. If they did not do this, then prospective users—
knowing that an asset owner with a relatively certain right exists, but not knowing who that asset owner
is—would use the asset less than if they were charged pi*. Although the ith asset owner would receive
a higher price, the use of the asset and the total rents would be less than at the rent maximizing price.
So, as long as u is not too large (as I have assumed), the asset owner would be better off spending u to
establish notice and forming ex ante contracts.
To consider the solution zones, designate asset owners i = 1,...,n as charging their unconstrained
prices and asset owners i = n+1,...,N as charging constrained prices. Then substituting (A2) and (A3)
into (A1),
N

vx

n x vx

vx

1 qi

c

0

i n 1

or

(A4)

vx

c
1 n

N
i n 1

1 qi .

When N=1 and pi > pi*, (A4) yields,
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v1 u x

c
1

This is that same as (3), so, in other words, the unconstrained price yields the Pareto optimal allocation.
When pi < pi*, then

v1 c x

c
q

c
but, comparing (A3) and (A2), q

c
1

.

Hence v1u > v1c. From this it is straightforward to show (see Bessen 2009 for use of the implicit
derivative) that x1u < x1c, or, the asset is overused in this case.
When N > 1 and at least one asset owner can charge the unconstrained price, (A4) can be written
in the form of

(A5)

c

vN u x

1

Z

, Z

0

From this it follows that where an equilibrium exists, vNu > v1u, and from this it is straightforward to
show underuse by taking the implicit derivative of (A5) (see Bessen 2009 for details).

Derivation of (10)
Taking the implicit derivative of (A5),

dP
dZ

v v
v x v 2 Z .

Then, as long as Z and v" are not too large,

d lnP
dZ

1
2

1
Z.

Comparing a change in Z from 0 to the sum given in the text yields (10).
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Table 1. Share of Public Firms in Technology Industries with Patent Applications or Grants, 1999

SIC Code

Percent with
Patents

Chemicals and pharmaceuticals

28

85%

Machinery, including computer equipment

35

87%

Electronics and electrical equipment,
excluding computers

36

87%

Instruments

38

88%

Business services, including software

73

35%

Industry
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Figure 1. Model decision Tree
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Figure 2. Solution regions
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Figure 3. Decision tree for classifying institutional performance
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